The pecking order hypothesis predicts that equity costs exceed debt costs when managers require outside funding. Asymmetric information costs motivates this hypothesis. I use an econometric model to estimate issuance costs managers face to test the prediction and motivation of the pecking order. The estimates challenge the existence of a pecking order. First, debt costs increase from about 50% of equity costs in 1973 to 140% of equity costs in 2002. Second, information asymmetry does not appear to increase managers' reliance on debt relative to equity, although information asymmetry costs are clearly present in debt and equity individually.
Firm capital structure is among the most important decisions managers face. Nonetheless, nearly 50 years after Modigliani and Miller (1958) shed light on the factors that can create value in financing choices, theories based on optimal leverage fail to explain observed capital structures.
One of the most influential explanations, the pecking order of Myers (1984) , is that there is no optimal debt ratio. Instead, information asymmetry creates transaction costs to accessing external equity, which are greater than the costs of accessing external debt, pushing managers to use internal equity financing, then debt financing, and, finally, external equity. In this paper, I show that the fundamental predictions of the pecking order are not borne out over time, and that modifications to the simple pecking order cannot align the theory and evidence.
Besides being simple and intuitive, the pecking order can explain a number of empirical regularities. The information asymmetry motivating the pecking order is one of a small number of rational explanations for negative reaction of share prices to new equity issues, and the pecking order is consistent with evidence that firms prefer internal funds to external funds.
1,2 Fama and French (2002) suggest that the pecking order is supported by a negative relationship between earnings and leverage.
3 Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) show further that the internal financing deficit explains more of the variability in capital structures than does a simple measure of optimal capital structure for a set of large firms.
Support for the pecking order is not unanimous, however. While Fama and French (2002) find a negative relation between earnings and debt, they also find evidence that leverage reverts to its mean. This is more consistent with a tradeoff or optimal capital structure theory than the pecking order. Frank and Goyal (2003a) present evidence that the pecking order works particularly well in large firms with uninterrupted data, which we would typically assume have low information asymmetry. The authors show further that the explanatory power of the pecking order appears to fade through time. Recently, however, Lemmon and Zender (2003) show that the pecking order results extend to firms in general when debt capacity is considered. Debate about the pecking order continues.
The extant pecking order tests typically start with a modified prediction of the pecking orderthat firms use more internal funds than external debt or more external debt than external equity.
The pecking order's central prediction differs subtly, but importantly, from the modified prediction tested previously. Under a pecking order, managers will be more hesitant to access external equity than external debt when both sources are available. That hesitance arises because of information asymmetry costs. Once in the capital market, the pecking order has little to say about the amount of new capital issued, because that amount is driven solely by available growth opportunities and available capital. Therefore, a more fundamental set of pecking order tests use the transaction costs managers face in raising new capital.
I use an econometric model to estimate the issuance costs faced by managers, thereby offering a direct test of the prediction and motivation of the pecking order. I document three facts that challenge the pecking order hypothesis. First, the relationships between determinants of new debt and equity financing are inconsistent with the pecking order's predictions. In particular, profitability and cash holdings decrease debt raised but not equity. Second, and more importantly, I find that the pecking order's fundamental prediction, that the transaction costs of equity exceed those of debt, does not hold in all years. Strongly counter to the pecking order, debt transaction costs exceed equity transaction costs from 1997 onward in the full sample and in sub-samples. Controlling for underwriter spread and other direct issue costs of debt and equity will only serve to reduce the evidence for a financial pecking order. Third, I provide evidence that the primary motivation of the pecking order, that information asymmetry increases the transaction costs of equity relative to those of debt, is incorrect. Moreover, this failure of the pecking order appears in time periods where prior research supports the pecking order.
Overall, the lack of relationship between information asymmetry and relative equity and debt transaction costs is strong evidence against the pecking order hypothesis. However, there do appear to be significant asymmetric information costs in accessing external debt and equity. 4 A number of modifications to the pecking order, for example, a dynamic financing strategy or the inclusion of distress costs, cannot create a pecking order in financing. 5 Taking this evidence in concert with the findings of other capital structure studies, a tradeoff-type model that includes information asymmetry costs of issuing is more likely to improve our understanding of observed capital structures.
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The paper progresses as follows. In section 2, I discuss the empirical methodology I employ and its relation to the predictions of the pecking order and modified pecking order theories. In section 3, I review the data and proxy variables. I present and discuss the main results in section 4. Section 5 includes a discussion of financial slack and comparison to other pecking order evidence. I conclude in section 6.
I. Hypotheses and the Econometric Model
The pecking order hypothesis of Myers (1984) is unique among capital structure theories in that it makes predictions about the magnitude and makeup of primary market transaction costs managers face. The costs of equity exceed those of debt under the pecking order, with the result that managers lean more heavily on debt sources than external equity. The pecking order arises in a rational world based on the result of Myers and Majluf (1984) , wherein asymmetric information makes up a substantial portion of these transaction costs. When managers cannot credibly signal the value of assets to outside investors, the uninformed investors discount new issues. This leads to a pecking order because shareholders hold only a residual claim on assets. Decreases in the perceived value of assets comes first out of shareholders' pockets, and they discount new shares accordingly.
Bondholders bear a much smaller cost of asymmetric information because debt payments are fixed.
4 Noe (1988) provides some theoretical evidence that an imperfect information asymmetry need not imply a pecking order.
5 Myers (1984, p. 589) suggests a "modified pecking order", in which firms mainly follow the pecking order, but recapitalize when the expected distress costs exceed some threshold.
6 Leary and Roberts (2003) show evidence that firms re-balance capital structure toward an optimal level. 7 Hennessy and Whited (2003) , for instance, present a tax-based model of dynamic capital structure with small issuing costs that predicts many of the results reported here.
Over-stating the value of the firm reduces the value of debt only because it lowers the probability of repayment. Because of this cost of raising capital, some otherwise-positive NPV projects become negative NPV projects to current shareholders. As typically understood and tested, the pecking order predicts both the existence of asymmetric information-based transaction costs and the relative magnitude of the effect over different classes of claims. A direct test of the magnitude of transaction costs in debt and equity markets is therefore a test of the importance of the pecking order. Rosett (1959) proposes an econometric model of transaction costs. In a general sense, the model provides a statistical rule for fitting the large benefit range, in which managers turn to external financing, and the small benefit range, the size of which reveals the approximate magnitude of transaction costs. Therefore, the transaction cost model is ideal in testing capital structure because it provides both a correction for the bias that transaction costs cause within a leverage regression and estimates of the magnitude of the pecking order effect. While not previously applied to capital structure, other economic studies have made use of the model and its variants. The intuition of a transaction cost model is straightforward. In the real world, there exist transaction costs which could prevent an economic agent from taking actions suggested by the costs and benefits within a given theory. When the value of new capital is large relative to these costs, the manager raises capital according to the theory. When transaction costs are large, the agent does not act, which result in zero slope coefficients for all variables. This suggests that we could get rough estimates of the relationship between the value of financing and a set of variables just by regressing new financing on those variables in observations for which financing is non-zero. Using the estimates obtained from this regression, we could then approximate the optimal value of new financing for the set of firms that raise no capital. The value given up by firms that did not issue is an estimate of transaction costs. 8 The most closely related to the current study is Asano (2002) , who examines costly reversible investment in U.S. manufacturing firms, and shows that a model including fixed costs outperforms other investment models. In Udry (1995) , respondents to a survey were asked to report only "important" sales of grain, so the author uses a similar friction model to account for a large degree of censoring. In finance, the most common application is in estimating trading costs when quote data is unavailable; see, for example, Lesmond, Ogden, and Trzcinka (1999) and Chen, Lesmond, and Wei (2002) .
The two-step estimation procedure discussed above, though intuitively appealing, can only be applied in a deterministic setting. The difficulty arises because in some cases, the value of debt or equity capital is actually much smaller than the slope coefficients would suggest. Unidentified costs and benefits of leverage and mistakes on the part of managers are two of the real-world hazards that can cause such errors. The less valuable new financing is overall, the more likely it is that these errors drive the new financing decision. This is exactly the same problem of censoring that leads empiricists toward the use of a Tobin (1958) model, and implies that parameter estimates are biased. The transaction cost model here is an extension of self-selection models and is discussed in that context by Amemiya (1984) .
Introducing transaction costs to the study of capital structure is not the point of this study.
Several empirical and theoretical studies are designed to control for costly adjustment, thus getting around inference problems that the pecking order imposes. Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989) derive the effects of costly adjustment on capital structure choices, showing that these costs prevent firms from returning immediately to optimal. Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001) empirically study a costly adjustment model, showing that there do appear to be significant costs to adjusting leverage. Recently, Leary and Roberts (2003) use a hazard model to estimate the length of time between capital acquisition, arguing that costs appear to be large enough to prevent firms from refinancing for around two years. Dittmar (2004) chooses to focus on the initial capital structure of spin-offs, thus abstracting away from the problem altogether. While these models allow for costly adjustment, and are therefore better able to examine optimal financing decisions, their approach is to remove the problem of the pecking order in order to study other models.
A. The Theoretical Value of Financing
With the available data sources, we can readily observe net external financing equity and debt financing, say N F e and N F d , for each firm each year. Without transaction costs, some model of optimal financing drives the value of new capital. The choices for such a model are seemingly endless, as Harris and Raviv (1991) reveals. I employ a model similar to that of Fama and French (2002) and Frank and Goyal (2003b) for two reasons. First, the modified pecking order hypothesis predicts that the distress cost variables enter into the manager's decision for at least the most extreme cases. Second, the model appears to capture important empirical regularities in financing value, even if the theoretical rationale is lacking.
9 In general, these regressions take the form:
Corporate profits determine the cash available for managerial investment decisions. Within the modified pecking order, firms with low profitability require more external financing. However, the pecking order also predicts that the shortfall is more likely covered by debt financing than equity financing. In regressions for debt and equity financing, I expect to see:
New debt issued is decreasing in profits.
New equity issued decreases in profits more quickly than debt.
While other studies study leverage changes as a function of profitability, the second prediction of H1 has not received much attention.
Given firm profitability, increases in debt also increase the likelihood and costs of financial distress. The only restriction on external equity issuance under the modified pecking order theory is that financial distress variables cannot increase leverage, so that any change in equity must be less negative than the associated change in debt. In regressions, I expect to see:
New debt issued is decreasing in distress cost.
New equity issued decreases in distress cost more quickly than debt.
Since most of the indirect costs of financial distress involve growth opportunities and since growth is highly correlated with information asymmetry, it is tempting to conclude that the simple pecking order predicts the opposite coefficients. However, growth opportunities make financing valuable in 9 I return to the topic of proxy variables in Section 3. 
The first line of equation (2) corresponds to observations in which the value of financing is greater than the transaction cost, τ i . 10 The second line captures the region in which the value of new financing is negative, ie, retiring capital is optimal. The third line represents the censored observations, where financing has value, but not enough to overcome transaction costs. Each line represents a conditional distribution of financing. We construct the likelihood function by substituting (1) into (2), assuming errors follow a normal distribution, and finding the unconditional distribution. Note that the transaction cost prevents the firm from raising the full amount of optimal capital. The cost structure here is quasi-convex, with a fixed portion and possibly large variable costs. This is in line with Altınkılıç and Hansen (2000) , who estimate that fixed costs account for only about 15% of issue costs. tails are given in other sources, for example, Amemiya (1984) and Lesmond, Ogden, and Trzcinka (1999) .
It is easiest to see the problems associated with transaction costs in a picture. In Figure 1 , the first line of equation (2) Any regression line will underestimate the predicted value of new financing, as regressions force a linear relation between predicted and actual financing. Transaction costs prevent managers from accessing new financing when the benefits are small, creating non-linearity between predicted and actual financing. The more censoring we observe, the greater the bias in regression estimates.
While the statement of the pecking order hypothesis suggests that information asymmetry drives the costs of issuing new securities, any pecking order story requires that equity transaction costs exceed those of debt. Most importantly, under the pecking order, I expect to find:
Transaction costs of new debt are smaller than those of new equity.
If we do not observe H3 in practice, then the pecking order as usually described does not describe managerial financing decisions. Should the ordering of debt and equity transaction costs change through time, then it becomes difficult to tell any story of financing in which managers rigidly rely on any type of security.
Given the estimates of transaction costs, we can address the impact that information asymmetry has upon managerial propensity to access external capital. The pecking order hypothesis is built on the condition that a major component of each transaction cost is information asymmetry. Moreover, greater information asymmetry increases the transaction costs of equity relative to the transaction costs of debt.
H4 : Disparate information increases the ratio of equity to debt transaction costs.
If H4 is not true, then the information asymmetry cost upon which the pecking order is built is incorrect. The ratio test is important for two reasons. The pecking order transaction cost arises because upon the revelation of good information, new debt holders receive less benefit than do new equity holders. Since equity claims are convex, and debt claims concave, the ratio of slopes must be increasing in information asymmetry. Second, as a practical issue, using the ratio eliminates any scaling of debt and equity.
II. Data
The main data source for testing hypotheses 1 to 4 comes from the Standard and Poor's Compustat database, though I also employ earnings forecast and analyst following data from I/B/E/S. Unless otherwise specified, dependent variable are measured at time t, and independent variables are changes between times t − 1 and t. Therefore, though the sample period runs from 1973 -2002, I include independent variables measured from 1972 -2002. I exclude financial firms (6000 ≤ SIC < 7000) and utilities (4900 ≤ SIC < 5000) because regulation binds the financing decisions of these firms. I include only firms that are listed on NYSE, AMEX, or Nasdaq. Table I .
A. Sample Selection and External Capital Measures
In order to measure new external capital, I use net equity issues (Item108-Item115) and net debt issues (Item111-Item114).
11 There are three benefits to choosing net issues as opposed to the level of leverage. First, issue sizes are directly under the control of the manager, and do not fluctuate mechanically as in Welch (2003) . Second, the pecking order hypothesis makes clear predictions about new issues, whereas any capital structure level is consistent with some history of peckingorder motivated issues. Third, breaking leverage changes into changes through equity and debt allows a more comprehensive test of the pecking order's predictions.
B. Proxy and Control Variables
To proxy for internally generated equity available to managers, I include earnings before interest, depreciation, and taxes (Item13), depreciation expense (Item14), and the ratio of cash holdings to assets. The pecking order predicts that profits will decrease the amount of any security issues.
Unfortunately, net income, the residual available for investment, includes interest expense, creating an endogeneity issue. Therefore, the gross profits measure is a more appropriate variable in this analysis. 12 I include depreciation expense to re-introduce funds shielded by non-cash expense.
Controlling for gross operating income, the existence of tax shields increases profitability and reduces firm reliance on external capital under the pecking order. The ratio of cash holdings to assets 11 I deflate these issues by the current year book assets (Item6) to reduce the effect of inflation and scale. 12 See Graham, Lemmon, and Schallheim (1998) for a discussion of endogeneity problems in tax variables.
captures the fact that firms with cash on hand will not choose to access costly external financing under the pecking order.
Prior work suggests that the direct costs of financial distress are essentially zero. 13 The more important considerations, therefore, are the indirect costs. At the same time, many of the costs of distress variables serve double duty as measures of information asymmetry or growth in equation
(1). To proxy for the probability of financial distress, I follow the approach of Fama and French (2002) and include a firm size variable, which intuitively captures the likelihood of diversification, and hence, riskiness of firm earnings. 14 I include the log of sales (Item12), as it further represents an estimate of income that firms can use to cover required debt payments. To capture the costs of distress, I have included the value of property, plant, and equipment (Item8), research and development expense (Item46), and the market-to-book assets ratio [(Item6 -book equity + Item199*Item25)/(Item6)]. Tangibility will increase the level of debt relative to equity under the modified pecking order model by reducing the costs of financial distress. High R&D firms are likely to miss out on profitable investments in financial distress, though it is much more difficult for high R&D managers to communicate the value of the firm to market participants. The same is true for high market-to-book asset firms. Under the modified pecking order R&D and market-to-book assets decrease debt relative to equity by increasing distress costs.
To help control for the value of external relative to internal financing, I include the lag of net equity and debt capital raised and the ratio of cash (Item1) to assets. Diamond (1989 Diamond ( , 1991 suggests that firms go through a screening process when raising external debt capital, which can reduce the barriers to raising capital in the future. The lag of external capital can also help control for firm life cycle influences in raising capital. Hennessy and Whited (2003) further predict that, in a dynamic setting, optimal financing exhibits path dependence. Because of endogeneity concerns in dynamic non-linear models, I estimate transaction costs both with and without lagged dependent variables. The results are robust to the inclusion of lagged dependent variables.
13 See Warner (1977) . 14 Alternatively, one can estimate the variability of equity returns, or, even better, the likelihood of bankruptcy implied by a model such as Merton (1974) or Black and Cox (1976) . This approach requires a long time series, or, alternatively, provides extremely noisy estimates.
C. Information Asymmetry Variables
I create groups based on two firm characteristics to address asymmetric information costs of equity relative to debt. The first variable is firm size. Larger firms are typically covered more closely by news services and are generally more familiar to investors. Thus, the larger the firm, the less the information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. I break firms into market capitalization deciles in order to ascertain the effect of firm size on debt and equity transaction costs. The second variable is analyst following. When the number of analysts increases, information has clearer channels through which to flow from managers to investors. Therefore, the greater the number of analysts, the less the information asymmetry. I assign firms to groups based on whether the firm is followed by no analysts (cannot be matched to I/B/E/S data), one to two analysts, three to eight analysts, and nine or more analysts.
15 These groups correspond roughly to analyst following quartiles. Estimates of transaction costs decrease with size and analyst following under the pecking order, as does the relative transaction cost of equity to debt.
III. Results
In Table II , I present summary statistics for sample firms. The sample is very close to the sample in Frank and Goyal (2003a) , therefore, I will focus only on the most notable differences. Profitability, depreciation, and tangibility vary only by a very small amount. The average sales in my sample are smaller, as well, but this is partially because I do not adjust sales for inflation. 16 There are two important variables that differ and can have a material affect on inference. The first difference is in book leverage. The sample here is more levered by about 6% of assets. This will tend to push tests in favor of the pecking order, as it suggests that firms are unafraid to access external debt over the sample period. The second important difference is with respect to the market-to-book asset ratio. When the market-to-book ratio is lower, it suggests lower levels of information asymmetry, and, hence, less of an observed pecking order. 17 Net debt issued is close to the values reported by Frank and Goyal (2003a) . Again, the difference is in equity issues, which are slightly smaller in my sample. This suggests once again that the pecking order effect is stronger in the sample here than in their sample. of firm years have censored debt and 22% have censored equity. The prevalence of censored equity observations relative to debt observations suggests that equity transaction costs are greater than debt transaction costs, consistent with the pecking order. Also apparent, managers are more hesitant to reduce external equity than external debt, with only about 17,000 share repurchases as compared to 31,000 observations with decreases in debt. This is consistent with managers protecting financial slack, which a multi-period pecking order model predicts. Positive external equity is actually a more common event than positive external debt, which is inconsistent with the pecking order's prediction.
The most surprising number in Table III is the number of observations in which leverage is clearly reduced, with both debt increases and equity decreases. This pattern occurs in a full 24% of observations, and is consistent with the pecking order hypothesis prediction that firms protect their ability to raise less costly debt capital in the future. The pattern also runs counter to the argument that firms are becoming less levered mechanically. High correlations among explanatory variables can induce instability of parameter estimates.
Therefore, I present a correlation matrix in Table IV . Almost all of the correlations are statistically significant at any traditional level. However, the magnitude of correlations are typically quite small.
The highest correlation (.315) occurs between the tangibility measure and depreciation expense. This is not surprising, as depreciation expense is calculated from property, plant, and equipment.
Overall, multicollinearity does not appear to be a great concern for tests here. 
A. The Empirical Value of Financing
I report the results for the optimal leverage policy variables in Table V From panel A, it is apparent that the oft-noted negative relationship between earnings and debt is robust to the existence of adjustment costs. This suggests that the tax rationale of debt does not fully explain the leverage decision, though measurement error can play an important role here. However, from panel B, the significantly more negative relationship between profitability and equity issues that the pecking order predicts is notably absent. This is inconsistent with the pecking order's prediction about the ordering of costs over debt and equity claims. In column 3 of panel A, changes in depreciation decrease new debt capital, consistent with the theory of DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) . However, they also decrease equity capital in panel B. If we take depreciation as a measure of potential discretionary accrual, then high depreciation expense implies higher information asymmetry about the true economic value of firm assets. This is exactly the kind of information asymmetry that the pecking order predicts will make all external capital more costly. Unfortunately, it is clear that such information asymmetry explanations are not creating a pecking order, since depreciation pushes firms away from debt at a much greater rate than equity.
Overall, the modified pecking order receives very tepid support from these measures.
From panel A, shocks to R&D and market-to-book are associated with lower net debt issues, consistent with financial distress costs influencing capital structure. Shocks to tangibility and sales, which capture the safety of firm assets, both increase the level of new debt financing, again consistent with distress costs. These findings are generally consistent with the modified pecking order predictions in H2. In panel B sales increases the amount of equity, so that less volatile firms prefer both equity and debt financing. Tangibility decreases the reliance on equity, while growth opportunities increase reliance on equity, consistent with distress costs. Here, the modified pecking order receives high marks. Unfortunately, it is also here that the pecking order theory is least distinguishable from other capital structure theories. R&D expenditures are negatively related to the reliance on equity. This negative coefficient is consistent with information asymmetry making external financing less valuable. Note, though, the magnitude of the two coefficients. It appears that distress costs are slightly more important than information asymmetry costs as R&D more negatively affects debt than equity. While this is not inconsistent with the modified pecking order, it does call into question whether the information asymmetry is serious enough to create a pecking order.
The size of prior debt and equity increases are both positively related to new debt and equity
capital.
18 This can be interpreted in three ways. First, the size of the prior period's issue may proxy for access to external capital. In that sense, this is an important control, since including these variables helps protect against financial constraint driving the results. Second, firms that are growing are likely to be accessing all available capital, while firms with little need for cash are more likely to be paying down existing liabilities. This, as well, is an important control for firm life cycles in financing and investment. Third, prior issues can also help control for target leverage, which has been found important in prior studies.
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Overall, I find very little support for the predictions of the modified pecking order. While distress costs are clearly important, the modified pecking order is hardly unique in its hypothesis that they matter. Regardless of controls for transaction costs, profitability is not statistically related to the amount of new issues. This fact is strongly inconsistent with the predictions of the pecking order, though measurement error concerns, such as those expressed in Erickson and Whited (2000) , may be driving the results. I turn now to the pecking order's transaction cost predictions.
B. Is There a Pecking Order?
I report Fama and MacBeth (1973) T-tests for significant differences in debt and equity transaction costs in Table VI . On average, it is clear that managers access external debt more readily than equity. Over the last thirty years, equity transaction costs exceed debt transaction costs by about 3% of firm assets. 20 The tests by period, however, show that debt and equity transaction costs converge over the later period. By the period 1988 -2002, the two transaction costs are much closer in magnitude. Consistent with Frank and Goyal (2003a) , the pecking order, if it exists, is much more prevalent in the earlier periods. Though statistically significant at traditional levels, the marginal cost of equity financing relative to debt financing averages only 1% of firm assets over the last half of the available data. A small relative transaction cost can generate the pecking order, however, it seems difficult to imagine that such a small difference in financing costs can dominate the tax and agency benefits of leverage adjustments.
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19 Leary and Roberts (2003) discuss this motivation. 20 Section 5 deals with the relationship between the estimates here and the costs implied by other studies. Anticipating, the estimates here appear to reasonably capture direct and indirect costs of raising capital.
21 Ju, Parrino, Poteshman, and Weisbach (2003) show the effect of small frictions in a model of dynamic optimal capital structure. To get a better sense of the time-series properties of transaction costs, I present the estimates through time in figure 2. Debt transaction costs are clearly below equity transaction costs for most of the sample period. However, from the early 1980s debt costs increase steadily. Equity costs, on the other hand, appear to follow a slightly decreasing trend over the same period. Debt costs overtake equity costs toward the late 1990s, remaining higher throughout the end of the 2002 sample. This calls the pecking order hypothesis into serious question. It is tempting to attribute the pattern to regulatory or other broad changes, but even if the direct costs of debt and equity change over the period, the pecking order still predicts that equity is always less costly than debt.
Because equity transaction costs exceed debt transaction costs only over a relatively small time period, this observation is only mildly damaging to the pecking order. The implication of figure 2, however, is that between 1997 and 2002, even the average firm is not following a pecking order.
The pecking order's predictions warrant close examination in the light of this evidence. To demonstrate the robustness of results here, I include estimates of debt and equity transaction costs estimated over size partitions of the data. In Figures 3 and 4 , I plot the debt and equity transaction costs for the smallest, fifth, and largest deciles.
22 First of all, from Figure 3 , the upward trend in overall debt costs occurs in each decile. This helps alleviate the concern that the explosion of technology firms in the late 1990s drives the prior result. It is also obvious that larger firms have much greater access to external debt. 23 In Figure 4 , the trend observed in the overall sample is upheld in equity, as well.
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The patterns are consistent for the deciles in between. 23 This is consistent with intuition that only the largest firms can issue public debt. In fact, over 75% of firms in the largest size decile have debt ratings as opposed to 10% in the fifth decile. Public debt, however, is likely more fraught with information asymmetries than private debt, implying that the transaction costs for debt are biased downward for the smallest firms and upward for the largest firms. This bias favors the pecking order, however, by making the high information asymmetry firms appear to face lower transaction costs in debt. The level of transaction costs is inconsistent with the pecking order in a general sense, though the cost of equity relative to debt is consistent with the pecking order for much of the sample period. I turn now to the effect of information asymmetry, and the theoretical foundations of the pecking order. Overall, Figures 3 and 4 suggest that information asymmetry makes it much more costly for managers to access external capital sources. However, a note of caution is in order. The transaction cost measures are implicitly scaled by book assets. With fixed transaction costs, each estimate decreases mechanically with proxies for the book value of assets.
C. Does Information Asymmetry Affect Security Choice?
One way in which to gain insight into whether information asymmetry makes managers hesitant to raise external capital is to estimate transaction costs over groups of firms with different ex ante asymmetric information.
24 In Figure 5 , I more fully explore the relationship between information asymmetry, debt costs, and equity costs. The relative transaction costs of equity to debt, as measured by τ e /τ d , do not have as clear a relationship with size. Under the pecking order, this ratio clearly increases with information asymmetry. While the largest decile exhibits an extremely high relative transaction cost, the very small transaction cost of debt drives this pattern. This very small debt transaction cost appears to follow from the availability of public debt as the percent of firms rated increases monotonically with the firm size decile. The very smallest and mid-sized firms appear to have surprisingly similar relative transaction costs. This is less true for the period from 1973-1982, but because smaller firms face relatively lower transaction costs in equity than in debt.
In contrast to Frank and Goyal (2003a) and Lemmon and Zender (2003) , and in contrast to the 24 Coefficients on the value of financing variables within the groups are qualitatively similar to those in Table V . There are two notable exceptions. Within each type of financing, the market-to-book ratio loses significance in the smallest decile, and tangibility loses significance in the largest, though they are of the sign reported. To save space, I omit the full results here. results in Table VI , this suggests that the pecking order, or at least its motivation, does not hold in an earlier time period.
To gain more insight into the impact of information asymmetry on debt and equity transaction costs, I regress the individual transaction costs and the ratio of equity to debt costs on dummy variables that identify market capitalization deciles. The results appear in Table VII . Subject to the caveat that size scaling understates fixed costs, information asymmetry clearly influences the transaction costs of debt and equity. The average debt and equity costs faced by the smallest firms are significantly greater than the costs faced by firms in any other decile in both a statistical and an economic sense. However, the ratio of estimates tells a different story. As the size of the firm increases the relative transaction cost increases as well, albeit at a rate not statistically distinguishable from zero. As a proxy variable, it is difficult to find a greater jack-of-all-trades than size. Size can proxy for information available, but also provides a noisy proxy for intangible assets and growth opportunities. Furthermore, Lemmon and Zender (2003) question whether large firms really have greater information asymmetry than do small firms. Another, more direct, measure of information asymmetry is the number of analysts following a firm's equity. To that end, I turn to Figure 6 , and the ratio of equity to debt transaction costs.
25 This figure is striking in its chaos. The information asymmetry proxy shows little relationship with relative equity and debt transaction costs. This is especially true in the first ten years of available data, a time when the pecking order itself appears to work well, and, again, calls into question the claim that the pecking order holds in earlier periods. To more carefully interpret the figure, I regress the estimates from each analyst following group on a series of dummy variables that identify the group. I show these results in Table VIII . The 25 The individual transaction costs exhibit similar patterns to those in Figures 3 and 4. intercept, the mean of the no analyst following group, is statistically significant at traditional levels, both for the transaction cost estimates and their ratio. Analysts do not seem to aid firms in accessing debt markets, at least until a substantial number follow the firm. Analysts clearly make equity capital more accessible for firms, however, as the mean equity transaction costs magnitude decrease with the number of analysts. Again, a necessary condition for the pecking order, asymmetric information costs in raising external capital, appears quite strong over the period. Based on the estimates of individual classes of claims, the ratio of equity transaction costs to debt transaction costs must decrease across at least some analyst following groups. Unfortunately for the pecking order, even moving to the largest possible following does not yield a statistically significant decrease in the costs of accessing equity relative to debt. 26 Once more, the pecking order hypothesis appears to fail when probed more deeply. The time-series evidence from transaction costs challenges the pecking order hypothesis. However, different industries can have very different values of debt and equity capital. In order to control for industry effects, I estimate the transaction costs for industries defined by 2-digit SIC codes. The pecking order's prediction is that transaction costs are higher for equity capital relative to debt capital in industries with more information asymmetry. To make sure that a large number of firms make up the estimate, I remove any industry with fewer than 500 firm years over the period 1973 -2002 . With these criteria, I am able to estimate debt and equity transaction costs for 35 SIC codes.
The cross sectional predictions for the pecking order are quite similar to the time-series predictions. The pecking order suggests that when the average firm in an industry has a high information asymmetry, firms in that industry will tend to favor external debt capital to external equity capital.
I focus on two widely used measures of information asymmetry: size and market-to-book assets.
Large firms tend to be in the public eye, which can help alleviate information gaps, while firms 26 Controlling for the apparent time trend, an F-test that the analyst following coefficients are jointly equal to zero fails to reject at any common level of significance, with a p-value of .42. The time trend is strongly significant. with more intangible assets or growth tend to have difficulty credibly communicating the value of assets to outsiders. Thus, we should expect that industry equity transaction costs are large relative to debt transaction costs when the market-to-book ratio is high and when size is small.
In Table IX , we see that these predictions fail. Whether measured by differences in transaction costs or ratios, the cost of accessing equity capital relative to debt are smaller, not larger, when asymmetric information is more likely a problem. The market-to-book ratio in Panel A, shows a reliably negative relationship with the ratio of transaction costs, which is much more consistent with Jung, Kim, and Stulz (1996) , in which market-to-book pushes managers to use equity rather than debt, than the predictions of the pecking order. Below the dotted line in Panel A, I present the results of the ratio regression, but with the two most levered and two least levered industries removed.
27 The results are qualitatively unchanged. Thus, the relationship between market-tobook assets and transaction costs are not distorted by extremely high or low levered industries.
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In Panel B, the relationship between size and equity relative to debt costs is reliably positive in ratios, though not statistically significant when measured by differences. Much of this may be that the estimates are implicitly scaled by book assets, which would push against a tendency for asymmetric information to move firms away from debt and toward equity. Ratios, which remove the implicit scaling, are not affected in this way. Again, trimming the extreme leverage industries does not change these results. There are at least three possible explanations for the results here that bear future examination.
First, as in Noe (1988) , the precision of managerial information could degrade through time. When the informational advantage of managers is based on noisy information, the pecking order can reverse, with managers preferring equity to debt. Second, perhaps information asymmetry regards mainly the volatility of assets in the later periods, as Myers and Majluf (1984) and Myers (1984) note briefly. The pecking order holds strictly if all players can agree on the volatility of assets, but when there is disagreement, managers can prefer equity capital to debt. Finally, an agency story like that of Jung, Kim, and Stulz (1996) could help explain why information asymmetry measures increase the costs of debt more quickly than equity.
In summary, the pecking order's predictions about the relative transaction costs of debt to equity do not hold. First, firms issue less debt but more equity when profitable. Second, equity transaction costs fall below debt transaction costs for a relatively long period of time and across broad ranges of firms. Third, information asymmetry is unreliably related to the ratio of equity to debt transaction costs.
IV. Discussion
An important question in interpreting the validity of the results here is whether the estimates of costs generated by the model are reliable estimates of costs facing managers. There are two main reasons to believe not. First of all, the model relies on an assumption of normally distributed errors. Even symmetric non-normal distributions make censored regression model estimates unreliable. Second, the response function for debt and equity are extremely simple, linear functions. This may be a reasonable approximation, but the form of these responses is unknown.
I turn to other, related findings on the costs of issuing securities to address the plausibility of the transaction cost estimates. It is worth noting again that the interpretations of costs differ critically between the estimates I have provided and the estimates of direct and negative return costs for two reasons. First, I have estimated the costs perceived by managers, which need not fully reflect costs to shareholders. Second, equity and debt in this measure include public securities and privately placed debt and equity, which have been mainly excluded from study. However, comparison across these different measures can help in deciding whether the transaction cost model's estimates are believable.
In Lee, et al. (1996) , the authors show that total direct costs of seasoned equity offerings from 1990-1994 range from 3.15% to 13.28% of proceeds. 29 By multiplying these costs by the issue size and then dividing by the median size of firms in the sample here, it suggests total direct costs on the order of 2.1% of firm assets. While this is several percent lower than the 5.75% from the transaction cost model, it does not include indirect costs faced by managers. Indirect costs include not only information asymmetry costs of the pecking order, but the revelation of adverse news about firm value. 30 Myers (2001) argues that a more relevant comparison is the average abnormal return surrounding equity issues. Among others, Mikkelson and Partch (1986) show that the average return upon equity issues ranges from -3.56% to -4.46% in a sample of 1972-1982. 31 Over the same period, the statistical model generates transaction costs of 4.58% of firm assets or a negative return to equity issue of approximately 3.42%. In terms of debt, the median direct costs of between 1.31-1.75% of assets and median share price reaction of -.72% correspond closely with the 2.25% costs predicted by the statistical model.
32,33
Three things warrant notice in comparing cost measures. First, controlling for the direct cost estimates in Figure 2 will push the point of crossing back to 1993, and will make it impossible to find statistical evidence of a pecking order through the entire second half of the sample. Second, the transaction costs estimated via transaction cost model are of a similar magnitude to the costs we might estimate through returns, though the direct cost estimates appear to miss substantial indirect costs to raising capital. Third, managers are accessing equity markets with a hesitance at the low end of the range implied by costs to equity holders. Managers are entering debt markets with hesitance on the high end of the range implied by costs to shareholders. These two facts in 29 Taken from Lee, et al. (1996, Table 1 ). 30 Smith (1986) suggests cases in which issues signal that profits are lower than expected. 31 Taken from Mikkelson and Partch (1986, Table 4 ). The translation is the return multiplied by the median market equity to book asset ratio in the sample.
32 This is a weighted average of the convertible and straight debt issues provided. I am unable to disentangle the types of debt in this sample. concert are consistent with agency considerations of capital structure, as well as the under-leverage first noted by Graham (2000) .
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A. Debt Capacity
The results of Lemmon and Zender (2003) suggest that changing debt capacity and changing values of financial slack can force firms to deviate from the pecking order. If debt capacity refers to the cost of raising new debt, then it is possible that the results of Lemmon and Zender (2003) drive the results here. In other words, the increasing cost of debt observed in the figures could simply reveal less debt capacity in the average firm. Unfortunately, the methodology they employ for the bulk of their study requires several years of future data, whereas the time that most needs consideration here, 1997-2002, does not afford such a luxury. 35 I will however turn to a test that I intend to capture intuitively the test presented in Lemmon and Zender (2003, Table 4 ).
To examine the effect of debt capacity concerns on the model, I estimate the model again within firms that are most likely debt capacity concerned and within the set of all other firms. I will refers to such firms as "debt constrained". Firms that have higher than industry median leverage are likely to run up against debt constraints in the event that they require new capital. These firms are therefore more likely to require equity financing if the pecking order is correct. Firms with lower than industry median cash holdings as a percent of assets can less afford to fund projects internally, making them more reliant on external capital. I take the intersection of these groups as debt constrained firms. The pecking order predicts that the costs of debt will be higher for this group, as the debt of highly levered firms behaves more like equity. The results of Lemmon and Zender (2003) suggest that these firms will face relatively low costs of equity, as managers will be forced to use equity. For firms with high leverage and low cash relative to industry, Figure 7 is consistent with the notion that debt capacity concerns push firms toward equity markets and away from the pecking order. In unreported results, constrained firms have statistically reliably lower ratios of equity to debt transaction costs than do unconstrained firms. Two notes are in order about the effect of debt capacity, however. First, constrained and unconstrained firms both violate the pecking order from 1997 onward, suggesting that an increased value of debt capacity does not wholly drive the reported results. Second, counter to the rationale of Lemmon and Zender (2003) , low debt capacity firms are not accessing equity because debt is unavailable to them. Instead, leverage increases the availability of all types of financing, it just does so for equity more quickly. Since the debt of firms with relatively high leverage is more equity-like, increased leverage should increase the costs of debt given the Myers and Majluf (1984) results. 36 Overall, characterizing debt capacity in terms of prior year debt levels appears to capture an omitted factor in the value of financing.
V. Conclusion
The pecking order's main prediction, that managers prefer debt capital to equity capital is not robust to period. Firms of very different size and analyst following exhibit these same patterns. It is clear that a pecking order theory, in which financing choices are rigidly determined, cannot hope to explain this observed pattern in financing decisions. It is also not enough to simply posit that the ordering of issue costs switch through time without first describing the process by which that switch occurs. Evidence here suggests that careful examination of the mid-1990s may reveal some wide spread factors that influence the cost of obtaining financing and capital structure.
Furthermore, firms with high ex ante information asymmetry have high debt and equity transaction costs, but information asymmetry does not seem to push firms toward more of a pecking order. This is inconsistent with the pecking order prediction that information asymmetry drives the value of debt relative to equity, but does not rule out a very important role for asymmetric information in capital structure. Incorporating this fact into agency models or tradeoff models may well yield a more resilient set of capital structure models. Net debt (item111 -item114), net equity (item108 -item115) in levels and scaled by book assets (item6), market value of assets (item199*item24 + item6 -item60) to book assets ratio, earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation (item13) scaled by assets, the natural log of sales (item12), the ratio of property, plant, and equity (item8) to total assets, the ratio of depreciation expense (item14) to assets, cash (item1) to assets. Correlations Between Independent Variables.
These independent variables are used in all tests. ∆EBIT DA/A is the ratio of operating income to book assets, ∆Deprec/A is the ratio of depreciation expense to assets, ∆ log(S) is the log of sales, ∆M kt/Bk is the change in market-to-book assets ratio, ∆P P E/Bk is the change in tangibility, ∆R&D is the change in R&D expenditures scaled by assets, Cash is the cash holdings of the firm at t − 1 scaled by assets. Transaction cost model estimates of independent variables predicted by the Myers (1984) modified pecking order (MPO). Each year from 1973 to 2002, net debt (item111 -item114) and net equity (item108 -item115) as a percent of book assets (item6) are regressed on differences in variables predicted by the static tradeoff and pecking order hypotheses to create value in financing. In particular, independent variables include the market assets (item199*item24 + item6 -item60) to book assets ratio, earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation (item13) scaled by assets, the natural log of sales (item12), the ratio of property, plant, and equity (item8) to total assets, the ratio of depreciation expense (item14) to assets, cash (item1) to assets, and the lags of equity (Eqty t−1 ) and debt (Debt t−1 ) financing scaled by assets. For reference, the first line is an OLS regression. The model also generates estimates of transaction costs to increasing the dependent variable, τ , which I report in Table VI and the standard deviation of errors, σ . A t-test gives significance of parameter estimates using the time-series standard errors, as in Fama and MacBeth (1973 Transaction cost model estimates for the model shown in Table V , estimated within firms grouped by number of analysts. The groups are 0, 1-2, 3-8, 9 and up. I regress the transaction cost estimates (Panels A and B) and their ratio (Panel C) on dummy variables for the analyst grouping. The intercept is the mean of the no analysts group, the slope estimates are differences between means. The p-value reported is a test of equality of means. -0.2334 -1.9361 *** -0.4285 9 and up -1.3080 *** -3.5577 *** -0.3417 ***, significant at the 1% level. ** , significant at the 5% level. * , significant at the 10% level.
Table IX
Debt and Equity Transaction costs and Industry Asymmetric Information.
I regress the relative cost of equity to debt on common information asymmetry measures. Relative cost is either τ e − τ d or τ e /τ d , and information asymmetry is either the 2-digit SIC code median firm market-to-book asset ratio or median firm book assets. For each of these measures, I present OLS estimates both with all observations (above the dotted line) and with the two most levered (SIC codes 15 and 79) and two least levered industries (SIC codes 56 and 73) removed (below the dotted line). Transaction cost estimates are obtained from the model in Table V Unconstrained, Debt Unconstrained, Equity Constrained, Debt Constrained, Equity Figure 7 . Debt and Equity Transaction Costs, By Debt Capacity. This graph consists of debt and equity costs for firms grouped according to the value of financial slack through time. Constrained firms have cash reserves lower than their industry median and debt to asset ratios higher than their industry median. Unconstrained firms appear are all other firms.
